Abstruct-We propose a new measure based on the informational entropy concept. It is designed to reflect the cognitive complexity, which users perceive when they work with alarmprocessing systems. An experimental verification for the proposed measure is performed. The result shows that the proposed measure is superior to the other measures. We also propose a procedure for evaluating alarm-processing systems based on the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) with regard to integrating a series of deviations that must be considered. This procedure aims to perform effective simulator-based evaluations of alarm systems' design. An exemplary application is shown in this paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
N A NUCLEAR power plant control room, the alarm I is a major information source used to detect a process deviation. In spite of the importance of alarm systems, most nuclear power plants still use conventional alarm tiles. This is mainly because "using proven technology in safety related systems" is one of the most important principles of the nuclear power plant design [l] . However, the TMI accident revealed that the operator could not handle various and voluminous information from the conventional alarm tiles. Recent studies have found that too much alarm information can make it difficult for the operator to diagnose the process state, and that modern computer technologies have the potential of greatly improving operational safety [2] , [3] . It is pointed out that the conventional alarm systems have several common problems [4] . They included the problem of too many nuisance alarms and that of annunciating too many conditions that should not be part of an integrated warning system. Many researchers, even those who recognize the advantage of conventional hard-wired annunciator systems, have pointed out the need for improvement of alarm systems through the use of advanced computer technologies [3] , [5] , [6] . This is why the alarm systems of the (next-generation nuclear power plants are being designed to be computerized and conventional ones are being scheduled to be improved by computerized . systems. Kim presented various advanced alarm systems [4] , which were intended to support operators' decision making. He categorized the alarm-processing techniques into nine different methods of processing or reducing alarms. These computerized alarm-processing techniques are intended to provide prioritized alarms for operators.
In order to verify its usefulness, system designers should evaluate a newly developed alarm system in many aspects that can affect the performance of operators. Conventionally, the most common evaluation method is an experiment that is based on the expertise of the operators. It is time consuming, and its results tend to depend on the participants' experience. In addition, the evaluation result is specific to the situation. That is, for a different target plant, for a different alarmprocessing algorithm, or for a different deviation, a system evaluation staff cannot transfer the experimental evaluation result of one situation to that of the other. He/she must repeat every step of every evaluation. Repeating the experiments with field operators for every deviation consumes a lot of time and expense.
The predictive/theoretical evaluation method is more attractive. These predictive/theoretical methods enable system designers to anticipate the performance of a developed alarm system without experiments. These methods require only repeated calculations with alarm lists which are recorded or simulated. They can be categorized into two groups: One is the method based on functionaYstructura1' theory (for explaining processes or relations); the other is the purely predictive method (only for predicting, not for diagnostic information). A purely predictive method is usually based on a regression analysis, which uses weighted averages to make a prediction. Regression analysis is a powerful and easy to use, but it has some critical limitations, such as the lack of diagnostic information, the lack of ability to generalize, and hiding information in weighted averages.
Hogg et al. [7] proposed a situation awareness measure, named SACRJ, in the Halden Project. They selected A' measure as an indication of how accurately an operator had assessed the current situation and nature of its effects throughout the process. The measure of A' is based on the signal detection theory. Park [5] also proposed a theory-based measure using the concept of A'. Generally, selecting analarmprocessing method and designing a display layout are the most important issues. Park pointed out that most of the operatorperformance measures hardly revealed the effect of each issue 0018-9499/99$10.00 0 1999 IEEE independently. That is, one may confound the effect of the display design with that of the alarm-processing technique. He tried to solve this problem by suggestinga measure named Effectiveness Measure (E). E provides an estimate for the performance of an alarm-processing method. It consists of an informativeness measure (A') and a reduction rate (simple ratio of the reduced alarms to the activated alarms).
A basic role of alarm systems is the provision of alerts for process deviations. Well-designed alarm systems could provide informative cues that are useful for the identification of process deviation. An alarm system is a system that is designed to collaborate with a human operator. Even with computerized alarm systems, the task of diagnosing the cause of process failures still falls to the operator 141. Therefore, the measure for an alarmprocessing system's usefulness should be a user-oriented one. Evaluation by E is a system-oriented approach because both the informativeness and the reduction rate contain the term related to the number of "correctly rejected alarms." Only a system designer is concerned with this "correct rejection." An operator of a nuclear power plant, the intended user of the alarm-processing system, has no reason to be concerned with the "correct rejection." He/she is not even able to recognize the existence of rejected alarms.
This paper proposes a new measure which is based on the informational entropy concept. Our measure aims at evaluating the usefulness of alarm-processing systems with regard to the human performance of identifying process deviations. It is designed to reflect the cognitive complexity which users perceive when they work with alarm-processing systems. Entropy has been widely used as a quantitative measure of uncertainty in many areas [8] , and early studies have shown that the informational entropy concept could be applied to the evaluation of the human's cognitive and processing work load [91-[111. On the other hand, in the early design phase, the absence of a well-established performance evaluation procedure is another significant problem. As mentioned above, the experimental evaluation is deviation-specific and we cannot transfer the experimental evaluation result for a deviation (e.g., a loss of coolant accident) to that of another (e.g., a steam generator tube rupture). Both the measure that are proposed in this paper and E proposed by Park provide deviation-specific results. The evaluation result for a specific deviation, whether it is experimental or theoretical, cannot represent that for other deviations. That is, the deviation specific results should be integrated for evaluating the usefulness of the overall system. This integrating method will greatly reduce the system development efforts in the early design phase.
In this paper, we propose a procedure for evaluating alarmprocessing systems with regard to integrating a series of deviations that must be considered. Our procedure aims to perform effective simulator-based evaluations of the design of alarm systems. It is based on the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), which Satty [12] originally proposed as a decisionmaking tool. The traditional AHP is known as the eigenvector method. The procedure of the AHP is well established and many researchers have modified or improved it in various applications (e.g., 1131, [141, [151) .
Shortly, in this work, we propose a new usefulness measure based on the informational entropy concept for alarmprocessing system evaluation and suggest an integrated evaluation procedure using the' AHP. We also perform an experimental verification for the proposed measure and present an example of the integrated evaluation.
A USEFULNESS MEASURE FOR ALARM-PROCESSING SYSTEMS

A. Characteristics and Evaluation Philosophy of Alarm Systems
An alarm system in a nuclear power plant control room must be designed to optimize the ability of operators to acquire the necessary information and to process that information in order to identify plant status and take corrective actions [ 6 ] . It should alert operators if a system or process deviation occurs but should not increase their work load.
First, we should define the circumstance in which human operators acquire "adequate information in effective manner" in order to evaluate the usefulness of an alarm-processing system. As mentioned in the previous section, an alarm system is a system that is designed to be collaborating with a human operator. Therefore, the better alarm system requires the lower cognitive work load and it also leads human-operators to make more accurate diagnosis. The user-oriented approach of this study forms a contrast with that of Park's E [ 5 ] .
The information provided to the operator can be categorized into two groups: content and shape. The content information has strong relation to the alarm-processing method (i.e., what alarms are so important that the operator should recognize them?). The shape has strong relation to the display design (i.e., how should alarms be presented?). This study focuses on the evaluation of the effects of the content information.
We can assume that the operator recognizes the process deviation based on the similarity matching. Early studies 151, 1161 show that this assumption is reasonable. Park [5] pointed out that operators could identify the deviation more easily with which they were very familiar. The operator's familiarity for a specific deviation is mainly dependent on the training program. Their experience in operating also affects this familiarity. Based on this assumption, we can obtain the key alarm set which characterizes each deviation by investigating some documents or by interviewing some operators.
B. Informational Entropy
Entropy has been widely used as a quantitative measure of uncertainty in many areas including thermodynamics, information theory, biology, decision theory, and sociology [8] . Shannon [17] , who largely originated information theory, suggested the most important information quantity, entropy, which played a central role in information theory as a measure of information, choice, and uncertainty. Hick and Hyman applied the informational entropy to quantify the uncertainty of stimulus events. Both investigators found that choice response time increased by a constant amount each time the information in the stimulus was increased by one bit [ 113. Early experimental results of numerous investigators show that human being could be represented as an information channel and the informational entropy is a more appropriate measure than the number of alternatives. Miller found that the number of categories to which stimuli could readily be assigned was consistently near seven for a wide variety of tasks. That is, a human being can be represented as an information channel and also has some vigilance limits on performing cognitive tasks [ 181. The informational entropy, therefore, could measure the difficulty perceived by operator. This difficulty is due to the complexity of recognizing alarms which are presented via an alarm system and the complexity of bringing back key alarms from the memory.
According to the information theory, the amount of information, bits, is simply equal to the base 2 logarithm of the inverse of probability, i.e.,
where Hi is the amount of information and pi is the probability of occurrence of event i. The average information conveyed by a series of events with different probability is computed as
where pi n probability of occurrence of event; total number of possible events; and n z p a = 1..
An important characteristic of (2) is that the value of H for not equally probable events will always be less than that for equally probable events. every key alarm for the given deviation. Fig. l(b) shows the situation with an actual alarm system, which presents some of key alarms and some of nuisance alarms. K represents the key alarm set, which can be obtained from operators' training.
Therefore, U -K represents the set of nuisance alarms. f ' represents the presented alarm set, which is processed by an alarm system. It should be noted that the more key alarms and the less nuisance alarms it presents, the more easily operators identify the deviation.
In Fig. l(b) , when an alarm system presents processed alarms of P , the alarms in B help operators to correctly identify the deviation but those in A lead to misidentification.
The alarms in C also obstruct the correct identification. The number of alarms helpful to identification is the number of alarms in B , 7&(B), and those harmful to identification is n,(A U C). We call the alarms in B 'hit alarms', those in A 'false alarms', and those in C 'missed alarms'. On the other hand, the absolute size of P U K also affects on the decision of operators. The bigger 71(P U K ) implies that the more alarms operators must consider. It will increase the work load of operators and may mislead them. Based on these concepts, we can define three effects on the identification correctness of process deviations as follows.
Effect 1) An increase in n ( B ) / n ( A ) or in n ( B ) / n ( C ) will
Effect 2) An increase in n ( A ) will decrease the correctness. Effect 3) An increase in n ( C ) will decrease the correctness. We can describe the interpretations of above three effects as follows.
Effect 1) When an operator finds an expected alarm among presented alarms, he/she will make better decision, Effect 2) When an operator finds an unexpected alarm among presented alarms, he/she will be confounded and may consider the other deviation, and increase the correctness.
C. A Measure of Alarm System Usefulness, R ( K , P )
In order to evaluate the usefulness of alarm-processing systems with regard to the human performance of identifying process deviations, a new measure is proposed based on the informational entropy concept. Using Venn diagram, Fig. 1 represents the situations of which the operator identifies the process deviation. Fig. l(a) shows the situation with an ideal alarm system. It suppresses every nuisance alarm and presents Effect 3) When an operator cannot find an expected alarm among presented alarms, he/she will be confounded and may consider the other deviation. the effects listed above. In adThe measure must fO1lOWS [SI.
. dition, it should have the properties which can be listed as 1) The measure should have scores which preserve the ordering of performance. 
2) The score should be defined even when there are no
3) The score should be estimated even when a single-pair
4) The measure should be nonparametric [distribution free]. In order to represent the three effects and satisfy the four specifications, we develop a measure R ( K , P ) which is named relation entropy, because it is well known that entropy is more proper for measuring human performance than the number
. By modifying the relation matrix ( K x P ) of the "amount of transmitted information," we can define the relation entropy as follows:
of hit and false alarms, and
By substitution of (2) to (3),
In almost every the probability of probability of occurrence of alarm i , alarm j , respectively; probability which is determined by relation of an alarm in P and an alarm in K .
deviation, an evaluation staff hardly finds occurrence for each alarm in key alarm set ( K ) and in presented alarm set ( P ) . In order to Improve applicability, we assume even probability of alarm occurrence. That is to say, 1
As mentioned in Section 11-A, we assumed that an operator recognizes a deviation based on the similarity matching.
Therefore, the relation between the expected alarm ( K ) and the presented alarm ( P ) can be considered as the comparison of the expected alarm with the presented one. If an operator finds an expected alarm among presented alarms, he/she will not compare it with the found one. Therefore, there is no relationship in this case ( K n P ) . For the same reason as in cases of p ( K ) , and p(P),, we assume even probability of the occurrence of alarm comparisons. The element of relation matrix, p(K, P),,, can be defined as follows: Table I shows an example for illustrating the concept of
We can rewrite (4) as follows:
Equation (7) shows that the developed measure R ( K , P ) effectively represents the three effects listed above.
VALIDATION TEST FOR R ( K , P )
In order to show that the suggested the informational entropy measure provides proper indication of alarm-processing systems' usefulness in identifying process deviations of nuclear power plants, we performed an experiment.' This subjective experiment uses the dynamic alarm console (DAC), which was developed for effective alarm reduction in Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) [l], [5] . This experiment provides deviation identification rates for 12 cases by varying the deviation scenario, the key alarm set, and the alarm reduction criterion. In each case, the result of experiment and that of measure calculation are compared with each other. That is, we examined the correlation between the proposed measure and the actual human performance index of correct identification rate.
A. DAC
DAC is a part of an advanced human-machine interface, which Chang et al. [ l ] developed for application to Korean Next Generation Reactor (KNGR). The roles of DAC are the processing and presentation of multiple activated alarms, the offer of alarm-related information, and the record of time history of alarms. DAC reduces the number of alarms by prioritization. The priority in the DAC is assigned by two methodologies. The one is the system-oriented prioritization which evaluates individual alarms considering urgency of recovery actions and severity of their impacts. The other is the mode-oriented prioritization which considers plant operational modes.
DAC eliminates unnecessary alarms for status identification and suppresses less important alarms among activated ones. All process deviation scenarios used in this experiment are departures from nominal-power operation mode. Therefore, in this experiment, the mode-oriented prioritization could be excluded. By the system-oriented prioritization, a specific priority score is assigned to each alarm. The range of this score is 1 to 27. Fig. 2 illustrates the alarm-processing scheme in DAC. Fig. 3 shows the example screen of DAC which presents first priority alarms in case of steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident occurs. The operators in Yonggwang Nuclear 
B. Participants
The operators in actual plants could be suitable subjects because of their expert knowledge. However, if the operators were the subjects of this experiment, we could not examine the effect caused by the change of key alarm sets because the operators had their own key alarm sets in their memory. For addressing this effect, the qualified graduate students who have enough basic knowledge for nuclear power plants are more adequate participants. Therefore, 20 volunteers (1 9 men and 1 woman) were selected for subjects of this experiment. They were specialized in nuclear engineering. They went through several courses in nuclear power plant system engineering. The volunteers were ranged in ages from 21 to 30 years and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All the subjects had enough computer experience and mouse device manipulating skill. They were informed that the correctness of identifications would be used as a human performance parameter. Randomly, we allocated 10 of participants to group 1 and the others to group 2.
C. Experimental Design
Using the full scope simulator for Yonggwang Nuclear Unit 3 and 4, we obtained the alarm lists for three process deviations, loss of coolant accident (LOCA), loss of feedwater accident (LOFA) and steam generator tube rupture (SGTR). We recorded the alarms every 5 s. Supervisory reactor operators (SRO) of Yonggwang Nuclear Unit 3 and 4 determined the key alarms for identifying each deviation. In consideration of experimental participants' knowledge, we excluded some alarms [e.g., the alarms related to control element driving mechanism control system (CEDMCS)] from this key alarm list in order to avoid confusing participants. This key alarm lists are called "standard key alarm sets (set l)." The effect of the knowledge of operators (training program or operation experience) can be addressed by using different key alarm sets. In order to address this effect, we made another key alarm sets, called "shortened key alarm sets (set 2)," in which we intentionally hide some alarms of set 1. Table I1 shows the key alarm sets of each deviation.
We parted participants into two groups (one for set 1 and the other for set 2) and provided them with a brief description of deviations (LOCA, LOFA, and SGTR). For each deviation, it also contained the names and explanations of the alarms of each key alarm set. An assistant gave the participants short instruction about this experiment. The assistant requested the participants to memorize key alarm sets and their descriptions. Then, he initiated DAC and showed the first priority alarm screen to the participants. The alarms presented in the first priority alarm screen are determined by the first threshold value (see Fig. 2) . In order to examine the effect caused by the level of reduction, we applied two 1st threshold values (a and p). The 1st threshold value a was a higher value, so it leads to the smaller number of alarms in the first priority alarm screen than / 3 did.
The assistant requested participants to identify the deviation before each deviation scenario finished. The order of displayed problems (deviation scenarios) is random and unknown to the participants. Each participant solved six problems (3 deviations x 2 criteria). Totally, we had 12 variations in experimental results ( 3 deviations x 2 criteria x 2 sets of key alarm). Table I11 represents the evaluation results. It shows the results of alarm processing by DAC (the number of hit alarms, false alarms and missed alarms). It also shows the experimental results (correct identification rate) and R( K , P ) values. The R ( K , P ) values are calculated using (7) for each case. The Pearson correlation coefficient (the point estimate of correlation coefficient) between the identification rate and R ( K , P ) , 0.614 18, is obtained by using a data analysis software package, SAS. The result also shows that the hypothesis, "there is no relationship between the identification rate and R(K,P)" would be rejected ( p < 0.0336). For the comparison, E [5] and A' [7] are calculated for this experiment. The Pearson correlation coefficient between the identification rate and the E is 0.007 33 and that between the identification rate and A' is 0.536 02. These results show that R ( K , P ) is superior to E and A'.
D. Results and Discussion
One may think that LOCA, LOFA, and SGTR should to be recognized easily even by conventional alarm systems because they are very severe transients. However, without alarm reduction mechanisms, even skillful experts tend to be confused when hundreds of alarms are presented (179 alarms are activated in the case of LOCA within 20 min, 104 alarm in LOFA, and 175 alarms in SGTR). In Park's experiment [5] , less than 30% of experts identified the LOCA deviation. In consideration of the participants of this experiment, graduate students, the correct identification rates are fairly acceptable. The Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.614 implies moderate relationship [ 191. We believe that detailed consideration of the personal characteristics (such as prior knowledge of nuclear power plant systems and alarm systems) will provide higher correlation coefficient.
In this work, we could not compare the DAC with other alarm processing systems due to the limited availability of other systems. However, we believe that the 12 variations in this experiment show the validity of R ( K , P ) and the possibility of comparisons to other systems using R ( K , P).
One can easily find the way to improve the usefulness of this alarm-processing system. The performance bottleneck of this system is located on LOCA deviation. When SRO's assigned the priority of each alarm, they considered various possible deviations. So they assigned priorities higher than generally expected. With this type of prioritization database, we cannot reduce the number of alarms effectively-especially for the case of LOCA which is the most severe and sudden deviation of nuclear power plants. The modification of the prioritization database for the LOCA deviation. is a fairly complicated problem. We could lower the priorities of some alarms. It might reduce the number of nuisance alarms in the LOCA but it could also reduce the number of hit alarms in other deviations. We should apply some different alarm reduction algorithms to solve this problem.
On the other hand, the operator training-materials' modification that will adjust the key alarm set is also one of the best ways to improve the human performance.
Iv. A PROCEDURE FOR EVALUATION IN AN INTEGRATED MANNER
As mentioned in Section I, the evaluation result for a specific deviation, no matter whether it is experimental or theoretical, cannot represent that for the others. In this study, in order to develop an effective evaluation procedure in an integrated manner, we propose a procedure based on the AHP.
A. The AHP
Satty [12] originally proposed the AHP that aimed at facilitating decision-making in problems which involved multiple criteria. It is used to elicit weighing information from decision-makers through verbal, numerical or graphical means. Traditional AHP is known as the eigenvector method because it produces a corresponding weight matrix and eigenvector. In this paper, we will make a short introduction about the AHP, because its procedure is that well established.
The following are the steps for the completion of the AHP H41, [W.
1) Define the problem and reduce it to a number of factors or elements. 2) Group the elements at different levels, forming a chain or hierarchy. 3) Construct a painvise comparison matrix of the relevant contribution or impact of each element on each governing element in the preceding higher level. In the AHP, weights are determined using pairwise comparison between each pair of criteria. Each comparison is then transformed to a numerical value in Table IV . The numerical value of each comparison should not greater than 9. The result is a positive reciprocal matrix A = { a j k } with a k j = l / a , k , where a j k is the numerical equivalent of the comparison between criteria j and IC. 4) Determine the consistency within these matrices using the vector of priorities. In order to compute the priorities of the elements in each matrix, the eigenvalues of each matrix are calculated. The priorities (normalized weight Intermediate judgements between two adjacent judgements eigenvalue and w is normalized eigenvector associated with A and AMAX. 5) Test for inconsistency using matrix theory. The consistency index (CI) is the deviation of the maximum eigenvalue (AMAX) from the number of criteria ( n ) used in the comparison process. That is, CI = (AMAX -6) Determine the consistency Ratio (CR), which is the ratio of CI and the corresponding random average consistency index (RI). At O&+ Ridge National Laboratory, colleagues generated an average RI for a matrix of size n (see [12, p. 211) . 7) Repeat steps 3), 4), 5), and 6) for all levels in the hierarchy.
n ) / ( n -1).
8)
Determine the consistency of the entire hierarchy by summing the products of each CI and the priority of the corresponding criterion.
B. The Problem Dejinition and Structure
Basically, one of the primary roles of alarm systems, both conventional and advanced ones, is' the provision of cues or alerts that are useful for the identification of process deviation [5] . Therefore, the usefulness in the activity of identifying process deviations that must be considered is the most important factor in an alarm system's evaluation. Fig. 4 shows an example of the problem structure of the alarmprocessing system evaluation. Higher level factors are the severity of a deviation and the frequency of a deviation. 
Frequency
In this study, the validity of generalization is not an issue. It is principles and methodologies that are being examined. In order to apply the result of R ( K , P ) which is proposed and examined through above sections, the exemplary problem structure represented in Fig. 4 is constructed. If one intends to get more generality, he/she should consider more number of deviations including accidents, nonaccident transients, and anticipated operational occurrences (AOO's). Also he/she should break down the severity of deviations into several parts (e.g., radiation leakage, system damage, etc.).
C. Procedure
The hierarchical structure represented in Fig. 4 implies that the problem requires six comparison matrices. One matrix is for the level 1 comparison (priority between the severity and the frequency), two for level 2, and three for level 3. It is noticeable that we can utilize the measure proposed in this paper for evaluating alarm systems for a specific process deviation. That is, we could make the comparison matrices for level 3 without subjective evaluation. In addition, the matrix for the frequency (level 2) comparison could be established without subjective evaluation. The Safety Analysis Report of Yonggwang Nuclear Unit presents the design-based calculation for the frequency of each deviation. Using these frequencies, we could establish the comparison matrix for deviation frequency.
The matrices remained for subjective evaluations are indicated with solid lines in Fig. 4 . The matrices for level 1 and level 2 are not operation-affairs but design-affairs. Therefore, in order to establish these two comparison matrices (one for the best system and the other for the severity of deviations), we made interview with safety analysts and system design engineers of Korea Power Engineering Company.
D. Results and Discussion
The analysis begins with pairwise comparisons and development of a normalized matrix. Tables V and VI show the established matrices for the best alarm system and the severity of deviation, respectively. In this study, we made five surveys for each matrix. Therefore, the data shown in Tables V and VI are the geometric mean of five matrices.
The Safety Analysis Report of Yonggwang Nuclear Unit 3 and 4 shows that the anticipating frequency of LOCA, LOFA and SGTR is 3.4 x lo2 [#/lo6 years], 4.5 x lo3 [#/lo6 years] and 5.75 x 10Y [#/lo6 years], respectively. It is well known that a human being estimates quantities in logarithmic scale [ll] . Therefore, azJ = log(freq,)/ log(frcq,). Table VI1 shows the pairwise comparison matrix for the frequency of deviations and the normalized eigenvector.
As stated in Section IV-C, we could calculate ut, by
It is not logarithmic scale because R ( K , P ) is originally designed based on logarithmic function. In fact, we already showed that R(K, P ) is in proportion to human performance. Table VIII(a)-(c) shows the results. The next step is the calculation of consistency indexes. Among these six matrixes, the matrix for severity is the only one which requires consistency check. From the matrix for the best alarm system, we always get the best consistency index (CI = 0) because it has only two columns and rows. From the other five matrixes, we also always get CI = 0 because they We should remind that the training (key alarm set) and the alarm-processing method (criterion) make a pair and that they cannot be considered in a separate manner. For example, by the result in Table IX , we cannot conclude that the key alarm set 2 is better than the key alarm set 1; it depends on the alarm-processing method. Generally, the use of the AHP in this example produced a simple and exact solution to the problem. It successfully integrates a series of evaluation results for deviations.
Seventy
are established by numerical calculations. CR should never exceed 20% and generally CR should be 10% or less to be acceptable [ 141. Followings are the procedure for calculating consistency indexes for the severity matrix. n = 3. XMAX = 3.166.
RI(n
... CR = CI/RI = 0.083/0.58 = 0.143.
Then, using eigenvectors in Tables V-VIII, the overall vector of priorities is calculated by following matrix operation and can be presented as in Table IX The priority values obtained in this analysis can be used to support a decision made in regard to the selection of one of the alternatives in the hierarchy. The result implies that the third (Set 2 + Cr. a ) is the best alternative, and the second (Set 1 + Cr. p) is the worst. As shown in Table V , the severity is more important than the frequency. The LOCA deviation has the largest priority for the severity. The third alternative scores the best in the LOCA deviation. The SGTR has the largest priority for the frequency: The third alternative also scores the best in the SGTR deviation.
The-result might also be interpreted as follows. 1) With the effectively established alarm set (key alarm set 2), the smaller number of alarms (criterion a ) are enough to identify the deviation. 2) Even with the rich alarm set (key alarm set l), the presented alarms by criterion /3 are too much.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose R ( K , P ) , a measure for an alarmprocessing system's usefulness. It is designed to perform user-oriented evaluation based on the informational entropy concept. It is expected to effectively quantify the cognitive complexity, which users perceive when they work with alarmprocessing systems. It will be especially useful in early design phase because we could estimate the usefulness of an alarm system by the short calculations instead of the consumptive operator-based tests.
Based on the AHP, we also propose a procedure for evaluating alarm-processing systems with regard to integrating a series of deviations. It aims to perform effective simulatorbased evaluations of an alarm system's design. It provides a relative rank among alternative alarm systems by integrating the evaluation results of the usefulness on identifying deviations. The conventional AHP determines weights using the subjective pairwise comparison between each pair of criteria. In this paper, we reduce the number of pairwise comparisons by introducing the measure R( K , P ) .
The result of the experiments for the proposed measure shows that as the problem contains larger R ( K , P ) , the correctness of identifying process deviations becomes higher.
The larger R ( K , P ) implies better match between the operator training program and the processed alarms. That is, the experimental result shows that both the operator training program and the alarm processing method should be considered concurrently when evaluating alarm systems. It also shows that the R ( K , P ) is superior to the other measures in predicting the correctness of deviation identifications.
In order to show the validity of the integrating procedure which is proposed in this paper, we present an exemplary application. Generally, this AHP based evaluation procedure successfully integrates a series of evaluation results for deviations and clearly shows relative ranks. More investigation including the enlargement on various deviations will provide a valuable guideline for the alarm system evaluation.
Subjective evaluations for the newly developed alarm system might be still required in validation phase, but we expect that the proposed measure and procedure will effectively reduce the number and period of subjective evaluations.
